Abstract Growth of the Indian economy has suffered in the recent years as indicated by decline in industrial production, capital formation, exports, etc. Weakening of aggregate demand and decline in investment could be some of the contributing factors for this phenomenon. While the slowdown can also be attributed to global slowdown, a high current account deficit and gross fiscal deficit, and continuance of a high rate of inflation are some of the most worrying signs for the policy makers. Restoration of fiscal sustainability and macroeconomic balance through stepped-up reforms are some of the key issues that need urgent focus of the government. 
Context of interview
Dr. Arvind Virmani visited the Indian Institute of Management Bangalore on the 19th and 20th of February 2013. He had just returned from the IMF in November 2012 after completing a three year tenure, where one, amongst his many contributions, was battling for a higher quota for India. Prior to his assignment at the IMF, Dr. Virmani was the Chief Economic Advisor, Ministry of Finance, Government of India (GoI). The interview was conducted keeping in view this recent assignment of Dr. Virmani. The following note presents the context of the prevalent economic situation as in February 2013.
The performance of the Indian economy has suffered in recent years. The rate of growth of the Indian economy has been on a downtrend over the last two years. India's growth rate has been declining after the country recorded a high growth of 9.6% in 2006e07 and 9.3% in 2007e08 and 2010e11. The economy has been slowing down as reflected in industrial production, capital formation, and exports. The slowdown can be attributed to global slowdown and a weak monsoon. As growth slowed, government revenues did not keep pace with spending and with declining government and private sector savings, the balance of payments came under pressure. Consequently, some of the most disturbing signs of the slowdown are high current account deficit (CAD), gross fiscal deficit (GFD) and persistence in high rate of inflation (Table 1) .
There is a trade-off between inflation and growth in India. While growth rates declined, inflation rates increased sharply in 2008, mainly because of the global commodity price boom. Food inflation was further affected by poor monsoons. The inflation rate had come down from the peak of above 10% from March 2010 to July 2011 to persist at 7%e7.5% in recent months. Food inflation, however, continued to be high and the rising level of food inflation widened the gap between Wholesale Price Index (WPI) and Consumer Price Index (CPI). As per the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) (2012), close vigil on inflation was necessary during 2012e13 to prevent reemergence of inflationary pressures. The RBI was raising the interest rates from March 2010 and these hikes along with policy constraints adversely impacted investments. Although the Government of India has taken some steps since September 2012 to tackle the situation by way of reduction in subsidy for cooking gas and fuel and liberalising foreign direct investment in select areas, the situation had not improved and perhaps calls for further measures. Some of the critical issues that require attention in India include restoration of fiscal sustainability and macroeconomic balance.
Aggregate demand
The slowdown in the economy in the last few years could be attributed to weakening of aggregate demand and decline in investment growth. Growth in India is directly related to investment which was declining in 2011e12, mainly due to the decline in the private corporate sector and not the household sector (which recorded a rising trend). The lower investment was attributed to high interest rates, drawdown of stocks, lower demand for exports from rest of the world, and policy bottlenecks such as seeking environmental permissions, land acquisition, and so on. As per the Third Quarter Review 2012e13 by the RBI, released on January 28, 2013, aggregate demand weakened during AprileSeptember 2012. The Review mentions that reforms since September 2012 have reduced immediate risks, but there was recognition that there still was a long road ahead to bring about a sustainable turnaround for the Indian economy. The demand revival would require improvement in the investment climate as well as investor sentiments through sustained reforms. To revive demand, policy and regulatory reforms would need to be introduced and competition enhanced in the markets for infrastructure services, land, agriculture and skills. India requires policy, regulatory and institutional reforms.
External factors
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 and the commencement of the financial crisis in 2008 in the US and to an extent in Euro area 1 led to a sharp decline in international trade around the world, gross domestic product (GDP) in advanced economies, and growth in the emerging markets and developing countries. With growth projections and risks relating to the advanced economies (US, Europe, UK) changing from quarter to quarter, the world economy has been on a roller coaster ride since 2008. The IMF's update on the global economy released in January 2013 indicated that the growth rates for 2013 in most countries (advanced and major emerging), have been revised downwards from the projections made in October 2012. The update brought out a downward revision of the growth rate projections for the US and many countries in the Euro area. In the emerging markets, India, Brazil, Russia, and South Africa were the countries for which a downward revision was made. The update also indicated that the space for further policy easing had reduced, while supply bottlenecks and policy uncertainty have hampered growth in some economies, with a specific mention of Brazil and India. An analysis of the growth rate of select major emerging markets over the last decade shows that while many countries recorded large negative rate in the GDP, India and China continued to record positive growth over the period (Table 2) .
Twin deficits
The slowdown in the domestic economy and the uncertainties in the global economy had an impact on key macro variables in India. By February 2013, India was in the midst of high twin deficits of GFD and CAD and despite continuous efforts towards addressing the twin deficits the situation persisted (Table 3 ). The global crisis had directly impacted the fiscal situation in India. The sharp slowdown in industrial production led to slowdown in overall GDP growth affecting tax revenues e especially corporate income tax e and the tight monetary policy since March 2010 dampened investment, subdued financial markets, and hampered planned disinvestment by the government. The rising prices of oil and fertilisers implied higher expenditure in the form of higher subsidy by the central government. The measures announced in September 2012 to raise the price of oil and related products were expected to address the issue of rising expenditure on subsidy. The GFD, though high, has been on a declining trend but a sustainable fiscal consolidation would require bringing current spending, especially on subsidies, under control and protecting the level of capital expenditure while also raising tax to GDP ratios. The future course of strategy would generally be to improve investment climate and investor sentiments through sustained reforms to enhance growth. The ratio of CAD to GDP reached a historically high level of 5.4% during AprileDecember 2012, rising to an all-time high of 6.7% in OctobereDecember 2012. The deteriorating CAD was mainly attributed to continued large imports of gold and oil, and in view of grim global markets, weak growth in exports, leading to a deterioration of the trade balance. This is a matter of concern, as in the past, the highest recorded CAD of 3% was in 1990e91, which was shortly followed by a major Balance of Payments crisis. In recent months, capital flows were helpful in financing CAD without a drawdown of foreign exchange reserves but volatility in these flows could put pressure on the external sector. Therefore, measures to lower CAD would need to be considered.
The government and the RBI consider that several measures announced in recent months are aimed at restoring the fiscal health of the government and shrinking the CAD as also improving the growth rate. With the global economy also likely to recover somewhat in 2013, these measures should help in improving the outlook of the Indian economy for 2013e14. Fiscal deficit would need to be contained, especially by shrinking wasteful and distortionary subsidies. On the expenditure side, the direct benefit transfer scheme that will allow the transfer of government benefits directly to targeted recipient bank accounts can help reduce transactions costs, prevent duplication, leakage, and fraud, and improve choices for the poor. Translating a number of subsidies into equivalent cash transfers could avoid price distortions and could target subsidies better to the truly deserving. This would help to enhance the efficiency of government expenditure.
Some of the issues that have emerged in the economic policy making, in the present context of financial crisis, involve measures needed for recovery of the domestic and global economy. (In these discussions, Dr. Virmani has made significant contributions.) These issues are consistency in reforms in the domestic and global economy as well as need for reforms in international institutions. The reforms that are undertaken need not yield higher growth in the immediate future but could do so with some lag and follow a Jcurve pattern. Finally, the policy makers should not believe that once an economy has recorded high growth, it will remain on the same path due to inertia. Rather, measures to ensure high growth would imply additional measures. These issues are presented in the following discussion.
Global complacency
When the global financial crisis struck, the US economy and world exports and industrial production crashed during the second half of 2008, and the world stood at the brink of the abyss of a second great depression. However, almost every large economy undertook quick and effective fiscal and monetary policy loosening, many in tandem at the behest of the IMF. This led to limiting of the fallout and induced a V or U shaped recovery in 2009e10, in terms of production in the advanced countries and growth in the emerging economies. This in turn induced a misplaced confidence in the resilience of each economy among economists and informed public opinion makers, and engendered a sense of complacency in governments and political establishments across the world (GOI, 2009 ). This resulted in the neglect of basic economic reforms that were essential for restoring economic growth to its full potential, both in countries where the crisis originated and in emerging economies that suffered collateral damage from this "great recession" (Virmani, 2012a) . With the underlying problems remaining unresolved, persistent political gridlock in the US and the Euro area countries further aggravated the financial crisis in mid-2011. Since then, other financial crises have taken off from the Euro area. This has created a high risk atmosphere in economies across the world, including India where growth continued its downward spiral (Virmani, 2011a) .
Need for quota reforms
The recent financial crisis revealed that China and India could withstand the crisis and maintain high growth while the advanced countries were not only at the epicentre but could not stage a recovery for nearly five years after the crisis. Similarly, there are emerging markets such as Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, and South Africa which are performing well. Therefore, much has changed in the world economic situation since 2008, and China and India are gradually emerging as potential superpowers. Accordingly, it is essential that quota reforms are undertaken in the IMF to reflect global reality. The IMF uses a quota formula to guide the assessment of a member's relative position that includes gross domestic product (based on market exchange rates and also on purchasing power parity), openness, economic variability, and international reserves. Traditionally, these variables have been chosen to reflect the multiple roles that the quota formula was designed to address e vote share, resource contribution, and access to loans (Cooper and Truman, 2007) . Thus, the quota formula determines both the quota contribution and the vote share of the members of the IMF (except for the basic vote which is assigned equally to all members). In a rapidly changing global economy, a rational and reasonable quota formula reform is fundamental to the credibility and legitimacy of the IMF (Virmani, 2011b (Virmani, , 2011c . Unless the power balance in the IMF changes to reflect the changes in economic power in the world economy, the IMF will inevitably lose credibility as an international institution (Virmani, 2012b) . This would reflect in the ability of the IMF to influence important economic policy decisions in different countries. This was reflected in the fact that during the Euro crisis, the emerging markets could not influence some significant policy decisions at the IMF (such as capital flows, stricter regulation and supervision of financial institutions, and easy monetary policy) and countries in the Euro areas. These policy measures, after five years of prolonged crisis, are now being reversed by the IMF.
There is a tectonic shift taking place and there is a very high probability that in terms of global power, the world will become bipolar by 2025 and tri polar by 2050 (Virmani, 2005b ). China's economy is likely to equal the US economy in size by 2020 and to become about twice its size by 2050. By then, India will be the second largest economy in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms, having overtaken the US around 2040. The gap in "power potential" between China and the US will be eliminated by 2040. Therefore, the IMF should recognise the role of emerging markets in the global economy and grant them more powers at the IMF.
J-curve hypothesis
A number of reforms were introduced in India in September 2012 but they did not make any visible impact on industrial output and on general growth in the economy. This raised a fundamental question as to whether there is a lagged effect of reforms on growth. Earlier, a number of reforms were introduced during the 80s and 90s in India. The country achieved a considerably higher growth trajectory, due to the limited economic reforms of the 1980s, though with a lag. Later, India carried out deep and wide ranging liberalisation of domestic and external policies in the 1990s. The economic reforms of the 1990s raised the growth potential of the Indian economy and put it on a higher growth path (Virmani, 2009 ). Yet, the growth rate in 1990s did not increase significantly and immediately. An important question that logically followed was how the limited reforms of the 1980s could increase the growth rate by two percent points, while the relatively major reforms of the 1990s had virtually no effect on the growth trend. This issue was discussed in detail by Rodrik and Subramanian (2004) who argued that reforms in the 1990s were pro-market, not only favouring the interests of existing businesses but also new entrants and consumers and therefore took some time to get reflected. Singh (2005) discussed the political economy aspect of the reforms in the 1990s. Helpman (2004) argued that major inventions can trigger an uneven growth trajectory which starts with a prolonged slowdown followed by a fast deceleration. There could be many reasons for this and Helpman and Rangel (1999) had argued that on-the-job training that raises the productivity of workers also means that technology specific skills are lost when a new technology replaces the earlier one. As per Virmani (2005a) and Virmani and Hashim (2011) , due to the enormity of the change following economic reforms, the transition from the old globally inefficient structure to a new more efficient structure takes the J-curve shape in productivity and output growth. The organised manufacturing sector in India has also witnessed J-curve pattern of productivity growth in the post reform period. Transformation of an economy from low income to upper-middle income takes many decades. A country is required to keep working towards facing changes taking place and challenges from within and also outside the country. Faster the growth, greater the change; with such growth, the trade-offs are constantly changing, and require a constant re-evaluation of the existing policies and institutions. Ironically faster growth also brings along some negative effects. As a country shifts from a low income category to the lower-middle income category, institutional adaptation and reforms also become essential.
Shooting stars or sprinters
There was a general belief held by some policy makers and part of the media in India that once having achieved a growth rate of an average of 9% or above, the economy would never go down below 8%. The expectations of the people and politicians in the country were also high and there was pressure on the Planning Commission to factor a growth of 10% or more in the next Five Year Plan. However, there were some economists and policy makers in the country who cautioned that growth inertia does not carry too long and far, unless fundamental reforms are implemented and the investment levels are maintained at a higher level. Similarly, it appears that many people across the world believe (a misconception) that achieving an average growth rate of 9e10% over 10 years is a simple task. Scores of countries have grown very fast, with GDP growth rates of over 8.5% for a few years, but only a limited number have sustained this average for a decade. To sustain growth, a number of factors are important. Hsieh and Klenow (2007) show that price of capital goods is an important determinant of investment and rising prices of capital goods could slowdown investment. Eichengreen, Park, and Shin (2011) , find that substantial impact on growth can be ascribed to decline in contribution of total factor productivity where investment, FDI, and policy environment have a role to play. Virmani (2011d Virmani ( , 2012a Virmani ( , 2012c terms this short term high growth which peters off easily and sustained long-term growth as the phenomenon of "shooting stars" and "sprinters", respectively. Generally, fast growth of a country in one decade is not a guarantee of equal success in the following decade. The key to transforming a low income economy to a middle income one is sustained, fast economic growth. Sustained fast economic growth can successfully result in a structural transformation from a low income economy to a middle income economy and from a middle income economy to a high income economy. Many countries have experienced fast growth (average of five years or more e shooting stars), but very few countries have sustained fast growth for a period of a decade or more (sprinters). Sustaining fast growth over decades is a very challenging task. Also, policy reforms required for sustaining fast growth are not necessarily the same as those required for accelerating growth.
Interview with Dr. A. Virmani
Prof Charan Singh (CS): To begin the interview, we would like you to tell us something about the Indian economy. It has been slowing down recently, in the last two or three years. And we would like to know your views on the remedial measures to arrest this decay and to reverse the trend in the Indian economy.
Dr. Arvind Virmani (AV): Since 2011, if one looks at the quarterly data, Indian industry and economy have been showing a clear downtrend. In one sense it is not a surprise, given that one was located in the global economy, and the external situation was so bad. By the end of 2011 it was quite clear that the economy would slow down unless remedial measures were taken. The main policy measures which have to be taken are fairly clear. The most important is a correction of the macroeconomic management which has resulted in one of the longest periods of sustained high inflation, sustained rise in the current account deficit, fall in the savings rate, the rise in gold (which has been noted) and so on. All these indicators have simultaneously worsened over the last three years. One of the key reasons for this is macro policy and in particular the fiscal monetary mix. What we need to do first and foremost is to dramatically reduce the fiscal deficit and simultaneously loosen the monetary policy. These elements, which I have pointed out above are clearly indicative of various supply and demand imbalances at different levels, from the micro to the macro economy. So the first order of business right now is to correct the fiscal trend, and the second is to focus on reviving private investment which again has declined dramatically over the last few years.
CS: Sir, as you have been the Chief Economic Advisor to the Government of India, we would like your comments on the following: Just before the budget, we have seen that the prices of diesel, petrol, gas, have been delinked. We understand that there is a problem with subsidies and the budget. But do you think that this is the right way to do this? Would such an adjustment not be inflationary for the country?
AV: The ideal situation in my view would be that administered prices be totally freed up so that they have no relationship with the budget at all. Unfortunately they have come to be linked with the budget and it is useful to understand why this is so. Basically it is because prices are controlled, and related to that is a subsidy which must be paid to the oil companies, many of which are public sector companies. So willy nilly the two get linked because subsidies have to be provided for in the budget. The budget makes a provision for subsidies on diesel, petrol, gas etc. which is based on two factors. One is projection of the international price, and second is administered price decisions of the Government to the extent these are controlled by the petroleum ministry. Ideally, they should not be so linked because if they were market linked then they would rise when international prices rose and fall when international prices fell and there would be no link to the budget at all. That would be the ideal situation.
What I have long suggested and fortunately what is beginning to come into play now is the following: What really hurts the middle class and particularly those with relatively fixed levels of income are the sharp changes which result when you hold off on price increases for months and years and then increase them sharply. So if you could let them loose and maybe prescribe a maximum limit, maybe maximum of one rupee per month or two rupees, then people would not even notice that the prices were changing.
CS: How about the inflationary impact of petrol, diesel, gas prices? Any special study done and any predictions?
AV: That's a good question because everybody assumes that it is a cost push world and whenever you raise diesel prices, inflation will rise. But I have often tried to explain to the public when I was the CEA, that a rise in price is not inflation, it is a one-time change. It becomes inflation when the rate of increase of prices increases. So yes, the perceived inflation or the rate which is announced goes up, and then you have a one-time increase in price of diesel, gas, and petrol. But it does not affect the inflation that is, or should really be, the target of monetary policy. Now of course this is very easy to say but harder to do when the public starts clamouring, because prices do go up faster for a while; however, it is still important. But the way to look at it in the Indian situation is you have a trade-off. You can either have an explicit increase in prices or you raise the fiscal deficit and that feeds through the whole economy and has an inflationary impact on the whole economy, not just on the relative price of diesel or petrol or LPG. So my understanding of the research is that at worst, this effect over a reasonable period of time is neutral and optimistically it has a positive effect because a fiscal deficit affects the whole inflationary environment as against the diesel price which affects the particular price of those sets of goods. So in a reasonable time period, let us say over a period of 9e12 months, it may actually reduce the rate of inflation. Of course the initial impact is a rise in prices, there is no doubt about that.
CS: That is a good point and I think the market does not understand that the rise is a one-time occurrence; it does not impact inflation and the link through gross fiscal deficit.
We have been reading your research and you have mentioned savings and investment rates. How do we raise the savings and investment rates? They have both suffered in the recent past. And how do you think we should deal with the widening current account deficit?
AV: When I analysed the balance of payments crisis of 1991, some simple research showed that every 1% rise in the current account deficit of the Central Government resulted in roughly 0.5% rise in the current account deficit. Now I do not know what the exact numbers are currently because that was 20 years ago, but I would not be surprised if one got similar sort of results today.
The second point is that the decline in savings rate is unprecedented. Historically we have never had such a reversal because whenever the economy slowed down, the savings rates used to go back up. This is the first time that a slowdown has resulted in such a sharp decline in the savings rate. Not that the savings rate did not go down, it used to slow down and then recover very quickly. Because when the economy slows down, the consumption continues and therefore the savings fall temporarily but the adjustment used to be reasonably quick. This is the first time when the savings rate has been lower than its peak for such a length of time despite a growth rate that is higher than 5%. The decline in the savings rate is firstly due to the direct effect of the rise in fiscal deficit (this is the national saving rate which includes both private and Government). Secondly, it is the effect of the combination of the fiscal and monetary policy. With monetary policy tight, despite a rising inflation, you get a shift in the savings from financial savings to gold and other such commodities. And therefore you get the simultaneous effect of a falling savings rate, higher inflation, and current account deficit.
As far as investment rate is concerned, it is a different issue. The first part is cyclical, which we talked about, and I think that can be corrected by the macro policy. But the investment rate is linked to more long-term aspects such as policy and regulatory reforms. In very simple terms, the shock to the economy from the global system was not adequately addressed by accelerating the rate of reforms. In contrast, the rate of reforms went down. What we got was the illusion of high growth for two years when we pumped up the economy which may have caused us to get complacent and then the investment rate collapsed because that was not sustainable. Now, pumping up the economy was quite valid and correct for 2008e09 because you had an international fall in demand and you had a squeeze on liquidity in monetary terms. So you had to increase both the fiscal deficit and the money supply. But the fiscal deficit should have started winding down in 2009e10, which did not happen. On the contrary, in 2010e11, you had this huge pump priming, which was not sustainable.
So what do we need to do for investment? There is a whole host of policy reforms which need to be implemented gradually. Everything does not have to be done instantaneously. The Government made a beginning in the October to December 2012 quarter. But in my view, more needs to be done if we want a quick return of the growth rate to the 8% level, which I believe is the underlying sustainable rate of growth.
CS: Inflation, you just mentioned, has been sustaining for a very long time. And it has been very high for the last three years. It influences all the policy areas. What would be your advice to policy makers and to the general public on inflation?
AV: We have already talked about the fiscal, so I will not repeat that. But besides that, one needs to look at the individual sources of inflation and at the sectoral supplydemand balances. The analysis reveals two major issues. The preliminary analysis that I have done of the recent period relates to i) agriculture and ii) the energy sector. With regard to agriculture, the relative price of agricultural goods e inflation has been high and we need to try and address those issues. A beginning has been made through FDI reform; the supply chain needs to be modernised. It is ancient and inadequate to the faster growth and bigger demands from the urban areas.
Second is the energy sector where you have a combination of things. One is the pricing, because the price has become distorted. It is not just a question of subsidy because you can delink subsidy from prices and you must do that. The prices must reflect the opportunity cost which is why you get the imbalance. You need to bring down rate of growth of demand, by freeing prices. If you need to give subsidy it has to be done in a different way rather than by holding prices. There are certain other problems associated with energy. For instance, we finally managed to get a lot of investment into power, which has been a problem for ages, but then we have a monopoly coal producer. It is a Government monopoly. Though we have all this capacity there is no coal to run these power plants, which are just lying idle. So there are number of policy reforms needed in the energy sector. One of the simplest would be to denationalise the coal industry, if not formally through the legal system, then by allowing more entry. For example, you could break up Coal India into the four coal companies which you used to have earlier and allow them to compete. You could allow private sector companies to set up coal mining companies. The cleanest way would be to change the Coal Nationalisation Act. But you can do a lot without doing that.
CS: Sir, you seem to have done lots of work on J-curve on productivity and growth. And in the recent months Government of India has introduced a number of reforms. Given the J-curve analysis, how do you expect the growth in the economy to take off now?
AV: Interesting question. The point about the J-curve was the difference between marginal reforms and major reforms. The argument of the J-curve was, when you have very large reforms, they lead to a change in the structure of the economy. And to change the structure of economy, it takes time and it requires extra effort. For example when you liberalise or reduce tariffs and quantitative restrictions (QRs), some sectors suddenly become uncompetitive and others become competitive. Therefore you could get a fall in the measure of productivity. It will take a little time before you see the benefits of competition and productivity increase. This is what happened in the early 1990s and through the 90s.
In the current situation, we are talking about the case where reforms came to a halt or became very slow. So the question is to revive the reforms. While it is not directly relevant to the current situation, we do get a related or opposite phenomenon of hysteresis 2 because in some sense there was a lag in addressing the real problems. If the same reforms had been carried out two years ago (let's say), the economy would have revived much faster. But given that for two years we did not do certain things, this leads to an accumulation which is the inverse of the Jcurve, and this means that the recovery will be a little slow or you have to make a bigger effort to get it back on track. I expect that it will take at least six months for us to see the impact of the reforms carried out at the end of last year and hopefully in this budget. But the economy will not suddenly go back to 8% growth. For that to happen, we will need many more reforms and it will take probably another year.
CS: We now want to talk to you about the international scenario, specifically the FDI flows to India. Comparatively they are reasonably lower than FDI flows to other countries. And this, despite the fact that India is a democratic country and has been generally doing well. What would be the reasons? How do we improve the FDI flows to India?
AV: That is a good question. There are two broad reasons. One, a positive reason, is that in some senses Indian entrepreneurship, particularly Indian dynastic entrepreneurship is very strong. In one of my earlier papers, I labelled India's growth since 2004 as "Entrepreneur Led Growth". I had pointed out that the problem holding India back was poor governance. The Government was actually a drag on the economy and because of the good dynastic entrepreneurship we were able to overcome that drag. Now what that means is, in some sense, there is less of an opportunity or scope for FDI. That is a positive.
But on the negative side is a huge problem, which is the attitude of the bureaucracy and of our systems, including our political system resulting from what I call the heritage of the East India Company. We still have a suspicious attitude towards companies and the private sector when most of the world, the part which is doing well and which attracts a lot of FDI, has a positive attitude. They look at investment as a generator of jobs and income. Unfortunately our bureaucracy has not been trained to think like that. It is beginning to change, it has changed among the young, but I do not think it has changed as a system. These indices of governance, of corruption, of whatever you want to call it, affect both domestic investment and FDI. But because the foreigners are not used to dealing with this type of governance or corruption, while (to some extent) our domestic entrepreneurs have got used to it, this constrains FDI. If we want to grow faster, we have to address this issue.
We have tried to address this problem several times before, but not successfully. The basic attitude towards those who create jobs and income has to change. For example (perhaps it is a dream), if you could incentivise bureaucrats and Government servants, to be rewarded on the basis of the number of jobs they maintain or create, in whichever area they are running, that could transform the whole picture, both in the economy and with respect to investment.
CS: China has been doing so very well in the last two decades or more. Also, China has been strategically gaining on all fronts. They have very good relationships with their neighbours, they are taking very strong steps in far off countries, as well as international institutions, and they have established themselves in a big way. Would you like to comment on India's foreign policy and diplomacy and any learning that Indians need to do from China's diplomatic strategy?
AV: It is an extremely good, but complicated question. So let me just give a few observations. We must remember that China's GDP is now about two to two and half times ours, in real terms. So they have more money. Secondly because theirs is a Communist party led government, they are less subjected to short-term pulls and pressures than a democracy like India is. What does that mean? Well, we have so many different interests that we are unable to define or constrained in defining a simple, straightforward, clear policy with respect to the external world. Despite that we have managed to do some things. The difference really is that China is very clear about its objectives. They have a small number of very clear objectives. And the whole system works towards achieving those objectives. Once they (the party leadership) decide that an issue is of interest to them, they use all their resources and they focus everything on that.
So what is the lesson for India? I think the lesson is that one, we have to have a little more clarity on our external objectives. Second, we must co-ordinate across departments which deal with the outside world. Often that common understanding is not there, to the same extent as it is in every country which is successful diplomatically. And third, sometimes one needs more resources. There does not seem to be enough interest in India to do the academic work or the background work which one finds most successful countries have done. They have a number of options generated by think tanks. We lack that. So these are the three simple things I would point out.
CS: Sir, there has been a slowdown globally and China's economy is still maintaining some growth, though slowly. What are your views on the impact of China's growth trend on the Indian economy?
AV: Since around 2000, I have been forecasting a gradual slowdown in the Chinese economy. If you look at their rate of growth relative to the world, it has actually been on a declining trend. I think that will continue. And the reason is very simple. It is what we call catch up growth; we know from history that growth always slows down as the per capita income rises and though China has been able to beat the odds over two or three decades, at some point, this will not continue. So China's economy is slowing down and I had earlier forecast that it would slow down below India's by around the middle of this decade. Unfortunately India's economy has slowed down even more in the past year or so, so my forecast is in doubt right now. But I am hopeful; if India does what it has started to do in the last six months, and follows through and does not give up, we could still get back to our kind of rising trend relative to China.
As far as the second part of your question is concerned, I do not think there is a direct link between China's growth trend and the Indian economy. China is really an export oriented economy and the only countries that benefitted from China (this is not conventional wisdom, it is my view) are the resource exporting countries. As we are not a major resource exporter, there is no clear direct link between China's growth and the Indian economy.
CS: The next question is on external shocks. In view of the global meltdown and repercussions, according to you, what should be the focus areas of reform initiatives to shield India from external shocks? AV: As I mentioned earlier, if we had reaccelerated or stepped up our reforms two years ago, we would have been shielded from the slowdown. Unfortunately because that was not done the slowdown has affected us. We need to reaccelerate the reforms in various sectors. One specific factor is that the net asset position of India abroad has deteriorated during this process. We have already discussed one aspect of this e the current account deficit. What that means is that our net debt position globally as a country has worsened over the last two to three years. Since the problem has accumulated, it will take a longer time to solve and that is unfortunate. However, in many of the developed countries fiscal deficit has worsened even more. So relative to them perhaps the danger is not so much. That gives us a little hope and a small window to solve it. But if these problems go unaddressed along the lines we have indicated earlier, then there could be a real problem. But I am very hopeful that measures will be taken to address the problems.
CS: Sir, there has been some news that BRIC nations could be using local currencies or local currency could be considered for trade in BRIC countries. What do you think about this?
AV: Well I think it is more of a political statement, more to do with the trust between whichever countries are involved. Given our current power position in the global institutions, at least three of us, India, Russia, and Brazil are not in a position to independently exercise great influence. So acting jointly with Brazil and Russia helps us to raise our profile internationally. And of course if China joins to form a solid BRIC, which it does occasionally, that helps even more. So I would say this is more a political statement than an economic statement.
CS: Sir, you have been the Executive Director at IMF. Could you guide us or tell us how India can improve its quota and say in the IMF?
AV: What we have done in the last two to three years in the IMF (as ED) is to say that the basic quota formula which determines the quota share and the vote and say in the IMF, is flawed. And that we need to reform it. We have given many suggestions which have proved convincing and probably so strong that people opposed to these changes are falling back on politics to counter them. So the battle or debate has shifted from real economic issues to the basic political issue that those who are in power do not want to give it up. So it will have to be fought at some political level now.
CS: Finally there was a proposal of the Asian Monetary Fund. What would you think of this proposal?
AV: It is called the "Chiang Mai initiative", but it is exclusive. It is based on what people call ASEAN plus three. The ASEAN countries, plus China, Japan, and South Korea. It is a system that is exclusive or exclusionary because it does not include all Asian countries. It certainly does not include India. And in my view, that is not a good way to develop Asian institutions. As of now I do not see any move or effort to develop it into an inclusionary system like the Asian Monetary Fund where by definition if it is Asian, all Asian countries should have the right to be members. I do not think that is a very immediate or even medium term possibility.
CS: Sir, thank you so much for your time. It has been very illuminating for us to listen to your opinion on various aspects of the domestic economy as well as international evolvements.
